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Nixon Club type of racial discrimination and sham membership
policy. Such a club might well be found to:
1)
2)

violate the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and
fail to qualify as a private dub under West Virginia
law.

Although not examined here, such a West Virginia club might
32
logically be in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act
which prohibits denial of admission to public accommodations because of race, and of the West Virginia Constitution which prohibits
the sale of intoxicating liquors in a "saloon or other public places".33
James Roy Gerchow

Constitutional Law-Freedom of Expression
The appellant, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, had invited
a television reporter to a Klan "rally." Films of this gathering were
broadcast on both a Cincinnati station and a national network.
Portrayed were several hooded figures, some carrying firearms, and
several engaged in the burning of a cross. A number of racially derogatory remarks were comprehensible, and one non-volatile speech.
by the appellant was presented in its entirety.1 The appellant was
convicted under the Ohio Syndicalism Statute of" 'advocat [ing] ...
the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily assembl [ing] with any
society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.' "2 On appeal, the apCoDE ch. 5, art 11, § 9 (Michie Supp. 1969).
CoNsr. art. VI, § 46: The legislature shall by appropriate
legislation regulate the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
within the limits of this State, and any law authorizing the sale of
such liquors shall forbid and penalize the consumption and the sale
thereof for consumption in a saloon or other public place.
1
None of the derogatory remarks were made by the appellant. His speech
was not inflammatory in nature, the only reference to any possible disorder being
that "[w]e are marching on Congress July the Fourth.... From there we are
dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the
other . . . into Mississippi." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969).
2
1d. at 444-5 citing Omo REv. Coan ANN. § 2923.13. Penalty for violation
of this act was a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or imprisonment
of not more than ten years, or both.
"Criminal syndicalism is the doctrine which advocates crime; sabotage,
which is defined as the malicious injury or destruction of property of another;
violence; or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial
or political reform." OIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2923.12.
7W. VA.

IW. VA.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 16
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

pellant challenged the constitutionality of this statute, but his conviction was affirmed by both the intermediate appellate court of
Ohio and the Ohio Supreme Court. Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court heard his appeal. Held, reversed. The Ohio statute,
in its language and application, fails to distinguish between the
mere advocacy of ideas and that advocacy which is directed towards
incitement to imminent lawless action. As a result, the statute contravenes the protections of the first and fourteenth amendments.
Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Brandenburgis the most recent of a rather long series of cases
which have been concerned with the constitutionally permissible
degree of governmental control over the freedoms of speech and
assembly. The problem is perplexing, although basic: it must
balance and reconcile society's interest in the protection of the
freedom of individual expression with its concomitant interest in
the preservation of peace, order, and the government itself.
The Court has experienced considerable difficulty in its search
for a concrete and workable standard to determine the point where
speech and expression lose constitutional protection. The position
of the Court in Brandenburg on the surface appears to be quite
clear. Before any sanctions may be placed upon speech, it must be
shown that the speech is something more than the advocacy of
mere ideas or an abstract philosophy. The Court noted that recent
decisions ". ..have fashioned the principle that the constitutional
guaranties of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy ...except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to produce such action." 3 When measured by this test, the Court
held that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional. If interpreted literally, it would serve to punish not only those who would incite others
to lawlessness, but also those who would do no more than merely
participate in an assembly which advocated some offensive doctrine.
It was also noted that no construction of the statute by Ohio courts
4
has brought it within constitutionally permissible limits.

-395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
1d. at 449 n.3. The only case in which the constitutionality of the Ohio
statute had been tested was in State v. Kassay, 126 Ohio 177, 184 N.E. 521
(1932). The consstitutionality of the statute was sustained, and the opinion
reflected the sensitivity to "insurrection from within" of that period. The defendant had been indicted for justifying an act which apparently never occur-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss1/16

2

Myers: Constitutional Law--Freedom of Expression

1970]

CASE COMMENTS

The Brandenburgdecision expressly overruled the well known
case of Whitney v. California,5 noting that Whitney has been discredited by a number of more recent decisions.6 The Whitney
decision upheld a California statute very similar in its language to
the Ohio statute involved in Brandenburg. In Whitney, the appellant was a member of and delegate to the Communist Labor
Party of California, which allegedly advocated the commission of
crimes and terrorism by unlawful means. Her conviction was upheld
on the basis that a "state in the exercise of its police power may
punish those who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances
inimical to the public welfare." Whitney relied on the earlier
case of Gitlow v. New York," in which it was held that a legislative
determination of what is and what is not a danger to the public welfare should be given great weight.
However the Court also began to recognize that the standard applied in Whitney was too broad. Prohibition of mere advocacy
of violent means of accomplishing political and economic
change would serve to widen the scope of governmental control
over free speech to such an extent that the first amendment would

red, for he was never indicted for doing the act. The court at times used rather
harsh words:
To assert that this statute is unconstitutional is to assert that those
who advocate and teach the necessity and propriety of the employment
of violence and terrorism . . . may go their length unchallenged,

and that they are even under the protection of the Bill of Rights and
beyond legislative and judicial processes. Such an assertion does violence to the genius of our institutions .... The various statutes on

criminal syndicalism ... are designed to punish those of communistic
habits of thought who prefer force to reason." Id. at 191, 184 N.E. at
527.
Judge Allen, dissenting, strongly suggested that the statute was unconstitutional, stating that it had "no limitation of time, . . . place, nor of circumstance." Id. at 195, 184 N.E. at 528.
'274 U.S. 357 (1927).
'Of the cases dealing with statutory "speech controls," the most prominent was Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951). Other cases of
note are: United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S.
116 (1966); Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (197) ; De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U. S.353 (1937).
"274 U.S. 357 (1927).
'268 U.S. 652 (1925). The defendant was convicted in New York for
the statutory crime of criminal anarchy. He was business manager of a paper
which published a "Left Wing Manifesto" and also a "Communist Program."
The Court stated that once the legislature, in the exercise of its constitutional
discretion, has determined which utterances come within the prohibited class,
then the Court may not consider whether a specific utterance within that class is,
in and of itself, likely to bring about the substantive evil. Id. at 670.
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be deprived of its force and effect. In searching for a more
just standard, the "clear and present danger" test became prominent.
It was first introduced by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United
States,9 where it was stated that the dear and present danger test
looks to the manner in which the words were used to determine if
there is a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
"substantive evils" which Congress has a right to prevent. In subsequent dissenting opinions in Abrams v. United States" and Gitlow, Holmes made it quite clear that he intended the doctrine to
have a limited scope. Being a necessarily subjective test, the clear
and present danger standard is itself subject to a number of different interpretations.The most recent case in which the clear and present danger
8
test has been expressly applied is Dennis v. United States.1
A closer
analysis, however, reveals that the Court adopted a standard more
closely related to Judge Hand's "balancing test."'14 It is apparent
that Judge Hand was not an advocate of the clear and present danger test, for he stated that the rule: "[I]nvolves in every case a
comparison between interests which are to be appraised quantitatively .... In each case the court must ask whether the gravity of
the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of

'249 U.S. 47 (1919). The defendant was charged with attempts to cause
insubordination in the military and obstruction of enlistment. His conviction
was affirmed.
40250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
"268 U.S. 652 (1925). Justice Holmes felt that there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government, and, therefore, that case did
not come under the "clear and present danger" concept which he had introduced in Schenck.
'Although the "clear and present danger" doctrine was first introduced in 1919, it did not actually become the prevailing standard until 1937
when it was applied in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). It was subsequently
applied in several other cases, including Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) and Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583 (1943). It remained prevalent
up through Dennis, since which time it has lain dormant. There is a noticeable
difference in the application of the doctrine in Herndon, where is was strict.
ly interpreted, and in Dennis, where it was given a rather broad interpretation. For related articles,.see Antieau, Dennis v. United States: Precedent, Principle, or Perversion? 5 VAND. L. R1y. 141 (1952); Antieau, The Rule of Clear and
Present Danger: Scope of Its Appalicability, 48 MicH. L. Rav. 811 (1950); McKay,
The Preference For Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1182 (1959); Mendelson, Clear
and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 CoLo. L. REv. 313 (1952);
RUc-hardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 Hmav. L.
Rv. 1 (1951); 60 W. VA. L. Rv. 91 (1957).
"341 U.S. 494 (1951). See notes 6 and 12 supra.
"Judge Hand expounded his views in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201 (2d. Cir. 1950).
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free speech as in necessary to avoid the danger."' 5 The Supreme
Court on appeal actually applied this balancing testi' and Justice
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that the clear and
17
present danger test is "not a substitute for the weighing of values."
A third view, which might appropriately be called the "absolutist view," is that which has often been expounded by Justices Black
and Douglas, and is quite recognizable in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Brandenburg.This view expresses the idea that there
should be no governmental control over speech, except in those
cases where it is clear that the speech is accompanied by action. Dissenting in Yates v. United States,'8 Justice Black stated, "[T] he
First Amendment forbids Congress to punish people for talking
about public affairs, whether or not such discussion incites to
action, legal or illegal."'19 The basis for this "absolutist view" would
seem to be that, while sounding good in theory, the "clear and present danger" and "balancing" tests are too easily manipulated by the
courts. It would follow, therefore, that once the door is opened to
any justifiable control over free speech, there is no guarantee that
this control will not be abused in the future, thereby negating the
effect of the first amendment. Although Justices Black and Douglas
have expounded these views at every opportunity, there is little
indication that they will be adopted by the majority of the Court.
Just which of the other two standards "dear and present danger" or "balancing" has become the prevailing doctrine since
Dennis is not clear. A study of cases since 1951 reveals that the Court
has adopted neither. Instead, it appears that the Court has been attempting to find some satisfactory accommodation between the
"clear and present danger" test and the "balancing" test. The
Brandenburgdecision falls in line with the recent cases. The most
prominent of these, and the one which Brandenburgmost closely
"Id. at 212.

"1341 U.S. at 514-15. Indeed, the Court cited Judge Hand's very words,
concluding that "[t]he Court must examine judicially the application of the
statute to the particular situation to ascertain if the Constitution prohibits the
conviction."
"Id. at 543.

"354 U.S. 298 (1957).
"Id. at 340. This concept was justified by Justice Black on the theory that
"The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can preserve a free government--one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor,
discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us." Id. at 44.
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resembles, is Yates v. United States,-s where the Court held that the
Smith Act2 does not prohibit the advocacy and teaching of forcible
overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end. The essential distinction was that those to
whom advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or
in the future, rather than merely to believe in something.
It is this idea which most clearly points out the departure the
Court has taken since Dennis. In Dennis, the Smith Act was justified
'
on the grounds that it was "directed at advocacy, not discussion."2
In his dissent in Brandenburg,however, Justice Douglas pointed out
that "the quality of the advocacy turns on the depth of the conviction." 23 It is this problem which has caused much of the confusion in
free speech cases, and the Court has become more aware of the
necessity of distinguishing between advocacy of ideas and advocacy
of action. The decisions in Yates, Brandenburg, and other related
cases24 reflect this awareness. It would appear, therefore, that the
standard which has evolved from these cases, while not strikingly different from those standards previously announced, sufficiently
adopts the concepts of both to result in a much more workable
standard.
While it is clear that Brandenburgdoes not present any revolutionary new doctrine, the decision does point to the need for a less
cavalier attitude on the part of state courts when interpreting their,
own statutes. Had the Ohio court made an attempt to narrowly
interpret the statute, there might have been no need for the Supreme

-354 U.S. 298 (1957). The defendants were convicted for violation of
the Smith Act, in that they were active members of the Communist Party of the
United States. The case was remanded for retrial on the grounds that the trial
judge's instructions allowed convictions for mere advocacy, unrelated to its
tendency to produce overt action.
218 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964). One violates the Smith Act when he "knowingly or willfully advocates ... the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States;" or "organizes ...
any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the
overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of . . .any such society, group, or assembly of persons,
knowing the purpose thereof." It can be seen that the language is quite similar
to the Ohio statute.
2341 U.S. 494, 502 (1951).
-395 U.S. 444, 457 (1969).
'See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 US. 116 (1966); Aphtheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, 367 U. S.290
(1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961).
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Court to strike it down. It should be noted that many other states,
including West Virginia, 25 have similar statutes. Perhaps the major
burden should fall on legislators to re-evaluate their states' broad
criminal syndicalism legislation; but, in any case, state courts should
take notice of the Brandenburg decision, bearing in mind that a
proper interpretation of the statutes are essential if they are to survive future challenges such as the one involved in Brandenburg.
Charles Blaine Myers, Jr.

Constitutional Law

-

Inter-Institutional

Juvenile Transfer: Due Process and Equal Protection
Michael Edward Shone, fifteen, was committed to the Boys
Training Center by a Maine juvenile court pursuant to statutory
authority.' Thirteen days afterwards, Shone was deemed "incorrigible" by the administrators of the Training Center, and upon
the approval of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Corrections, he was transferred to the Men's Correctional Center.2 This

W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 1, § 5 (Michie 1966):
It shall be unlawful for any person to speak, print, publish, or communicate ...any teachings, doctrines or counsels in sympathy with or in favor
of ideals, institutions, or forms of government hostile ...to those now ...
existing under the Constitution and laws of this State or of the United
States, or in sympathy with or in favor of the propriety, duty, and
necessity of crime, violence or other unlawful means of terrorism, as a
means of accomplishing economic or political reform, or in sympathy
with or in favor of the overthrow of organized society, the unlawful
destruction of property or the violation of law.
1
ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2714 (Supp. 1967) provided in part that
"[a] boy between the ages of 11 and 17 may be committed to the Boys
Training Center .... All commitments of such children shall be for the term
of their minority, unless sooner discharged by the superintendent .... "
2
At the time of Shone's transfer, M. Rv. STAT. ANN, tit. 34, § 801 (Supp.
1967) provided in part that:
the Men's Correctional Center . . . shall be maintained for the confinement and rehabilitation of: (1) Males between 16 and 17 years of
age . . . after being adjudicated by the juvenile court to have committed juvenile offenses. (2) Males over 15 years of age. Males over
15 years of age determined in accordance with Title 15, section 2717 to
be incorrigible while under commitment to the Boys Training Center....
The provisions for the safekeeping or employment of such inmates shall
be made for the purpose of teaching such inmates a useful trade or profession, and improving their mental and moral condition.
Shone v. Maine, 406 F. 2d 844, 845 n.2 (1969).
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